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ALEXIUS MEINONG’S THEORY OF OBJECTS
ABSTRACT
In the history of philosophy, Alexius Meinong’s interest in axiology has 
traditionally been seen as confined to his earlier works. However, if we 
analyze his writing after 1917, in which Meinong discusses timeless 
values, it becomes clear that he became increasingly disinterested in 
psychology. Moreover, since the theory of the object, in Meinong’s view, 
could not be a part of metaphysics, he had to deal with the additional 
methodological difficulty of proving that the good exists independently 
of human subjectivity. The article discusses A. Meinong’s understanding 
of the object of desire, the object of a value-feeling and the connection 
between ethical values as objects of consciousness and time. It is shown 
that, according to Meinong, language is where values actually reside and 
only through language can their reality be explained.
Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects was brought to the forefront of public 
discussion owing to a debate initiated by Bertrand Russell and, to a certain 
extent, owing to the logical interpretation proposed by the former’s disciple 
and successor Ernst Mally (Mally 1912). Though Russell thought highly of Mei-
nong’s works, his theory of objects came under criticism for being inconsistent 
and unpromising on the grounds that analytical philosophy cannot deal with 
non-existent objects (Russell 1923, Russell 1973). In the 1970s and 80s, revi-
talization of the theory of non-existent objects (Lambert 1974, Parson 1974, 
Routley 1973, Smith 1975) brought renewed interest in Meinong’s philosophy, 
while in the same period Gilbert Ryle published his work “Intentionality – 
Theory and the Nature of Thinking”, which provoked further reconsideration 
and debate regarding Meinong’s theory (Ryle 1972: 1973). Ryle claimed that 
Meinong was outdated and had nothing to contribute to the development of 
modern philosophical thought. Rudolf Haller, one of the leading experts on 
Austrian philosophy, however, questioned Ryle’s conclusions and pointed out 
the significance of the epistemological and axiological aspects of the theory of 
objects. “Let us agree that for a long time there was a common misconception 
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that what Meinong was destined to enjoy was some kind of ‘reflected immor-
tality’ – being known through Russell’s critique – and that Meinong’s own 
achievements in the sphere of cognition theory and ethics did not receive any 
public recognition or, at least, any further development. This was, however, a 
deceptive impression: it has been proven wrong many times and has already 
experienced multiple transformations.” (Haller 1979: 37–38). One cannot but 
agree with this opinion since Meinong’s theory continues to excite consider-
able interest at least among the historians of philosophy who find traces of 
his influence on contemporary philosophers (for example, Seliverstov 2018: 
109– 122). Thus, although the theory of objects re-emerges from time to time, 
the problem of values continues to be ignored. “Attention is paid primarily to 
the first, psychological stage of Meinong’s value theory while the second, ‘ob-
jectivist’ one, remains outside scholarly interest” (Wolf 1968: 46). 
Initially, Meinong envisioned his theory of objects as a general theory that 
would be equally significant for all fields ranging from economics to aesthet-
ics. He expected this theory to play a methodological role because the concept 
of object is universal and can be applied to all mental facts. The object is giv-
en for any form of cognitive process. Karl Wolf, an Austrian scholar, contend-
ed that “as opposed to Edmund Husserl, who considers his ‘essences’ as cor-
relates of pure consciousness and thus comes very near to transcendentalism, 
Meinong asserts the principle of objects being independent from the mind as 
the main point of objectivism” (Wolf 1968: 33). This indicates the difference 
of Meinong’s theory from that of Husserl, another famous disciple of Franz 
Brentano. Thus it is impossible to interpret the theory of objects in the light 
of Kantian idealism, a feature of all Austrian philosophy. 
Therefore, we can discern here that Austrian philosophers distrusted Kan-
tian apriorism and were more inclined to empiricist and positivist principles 
in philosophy. Meinong emphasized that the ‘empiricism’ of Austrian philos-
ophers in the late nineteenth century prevented them from prescribing the na-
ture of its laws, when instead it would “be more reasonable to try to explore 
them” (Meinong 1988: 53). It is important to highlight that Meinong saw his 
theory of objects as an approach that would allow us to solve many complex 
philosophical problems rather than something purely scholastic or detached 
from reality; it would address precisely those issues about which philosophers 
of language would advise to keep silent (Mauthner 1980, Wittgenstein 2014).
Psychology, Logic, Cognitive Theory or Metaphysics?
All mental acts such as experience, feelings, desires, understanding, are inten-
tional; that is, they always have an object at which they are directed. The ex-
istence of these objects can have a different status. In some cases, objects are 
not real but it does not mean that they are non-existent. Regardless of whether 
the object is or is not perceived, it is given and is represented in the mind. It is 
evident that cognition always has an object but similarly ‘Gegenstand’ (‘what 
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stands against’) is perceived by the subject of the mental act. The object is not 
created in the process of cognition but precedes it, it is given on the logical 
and psychological plane. “Each inner experience, at least an elementary one, 
has such an object and, since experience is expressed through words and sen-
tences of the language, this expression normally correlates with the meaning, 
which is necessarily its object” (Meinong 1988: 68).
Meinong was influenced not only by Brentano but also by David Hume and 
his theory of association. In his autobiography “Self-Presentation” (“Selbst-
darstellung”) (Meinong 1988: 57), Meinong points out that his early work on 
Hume’s philosophy was focused on the problem of abstract ideas and concepts 
(Meinong 1969a).
Meinong maintains that Hume more fully developed Locke’s version of em-
piricism and advanced his principles of association of ideas, considering them 
to be mental phenomena (Meinong 1969a: 61). One of the three principles of 
association is the principle of resemblance: “if we named an object and then 
met a similar one, then we would reproduce... the first object and the word we 
introduced for this purpose... If we hear names, then in our mind associated 
individual representations spring up, and precisely those that arise from the 
coincidence of association. How does this correspond to other ideas associ-
ated in the same way?  They do not appear to us as real, but only as possibly 
present. When, however? From the moment the name was invoked?” (Mei-
nong 1969a: 51). Thus, Meinong emphasizes the elements of Hume’s theory 
that are of special interest to him in order to pose the question of the existence 
of mental objects and the methods of subjecting them to analysis. 
 Although he studied mental phenomena, Meinong indicated that the the-
ory of objects did not fall within the domain of psychology, though it could 
contribute to the development of psychology. Meinong, like the majority of 
Austrian philosophers at the turn of the twentieth century, believed that psy-
chology was able to synthesize experiment and theory. He recalled conducting 
lessons on psychology in 1880 in Vienna, during which he demonstrated some 
simple experiments. Although he lacked the illustrative resources to improve 
the course, he believed that his work was crucial for the opening of the first 
Austrian Institute of Experimental Psychology (Meinong 1988: 58). 
Meinong asserts that, strictly speaking, the theory of objects focuses not on 
mental processes as such but on the objects at which these mental processes 
can be directed, therefore, the approach applied cannot be defined as psycho-
logical but rather as a more general and theoretical one (Meinong 1969b: 501).
In a similar way, the theory of objects does not belong to the domain of 
logic, though it deals with the questions that are related to the subject matter 
of logical reasoning. In these arguments, Meinong refers to Husserl’s “Logical 
Investigations” (Husserl 2013) and emphasizes that Husserl’s critique of psy-
chologism in logic is quite justified. An epistemology that aims at a more fun-
damental study of cognition than what is accessible by logic is not yet identical 
with the theory of the object in its content. Although epistemology supposedly 
deals with self-cognition and the cognized object, we should not exclude from 
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the range of objects those at which our extra-mental experiences are directed 
(Meinong 1969b: 495).
Meinong takes a stand against metaphysics, which was characteristic of 
Austrian philosophy, as it has been noted above. The theory of objects can 
be a philosophical discipline but it by no means belongs to metaphysics since 
the latter studies the totality of what is real (Gesamtheit des Wirklichen). The 
point is that the range of mental objects could include those that do not exist. 
Taking into consideration the special place of the theory of objects, it cannot 
be expected to rely on empirical methodology in its analysis of the objective 
world. This is where Meinong differs from Brentano’s late philosophy and re-
veals his affinity to Bernard Bolzano’s theory of proposition-in-itself (Satz-an-
sich) (Johnston 1972: 300).
Objects of Value-Feeling and Objects of Desire
For Meinong it was important to address the perennial axiological question: 
do universal human values actually exist? It was the period in philosophy when 
the Neo-Kantian movement initiated new ways of exploring values: are they 
real? are they objective or subjective? 
Meinong maintained that for philosophy it is essential to preserve its meth-
odological role in this sphere and believed that the theory of objects could 
provide philosophers with the necessary distance from practical issues, which 
had to be addressed by such sciences as economics and ethics (Meinong 1988: 
96). It was not by chance that he referred to economics since the question of val-
ues was raised by Carl Menger’s critique of the labor theory of value. Menger’s 
law of ‘diminishing marginal utility’ explained the connection between the 
utility and supply of a particular good and showed why the value of a good 
depends exclusively on its marginal utility. Menger was supposedly also influ-
enced by Brentano’s “Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint” and, there-
fore, paid much attention to the problems of consumption psychology (John-
ston 1972: 83). Meinong attended Menger’s lectures on national economy and 
believed that his theory would underpin the economic understanding of value. 
His [Meinong’s] writing also reveals the influence of the Austrian school of na-
tional economic value theory, which he thoroughly modifies: on the one hand, 
value is subjectively constituted: it is ingrained in our memory as subjective 
representation rather than as a real attribute of an object. On the other hand, 
Meinong argues for the objective character of value, which is given through its 
presence in our emotions (Kampits 1984: 141) 
Meinong emphasizes that in his theory of objects the place of the ‘Supreme 
Good’ is not discussed in the hierarchy of values. First of all, we need to explain 
how the individual and the universal are connected in value objects, which 
would further enable us to demonstrate the relationships between values, needs 
and interests in a wide range of fields, including economics. 
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 Value as the key concept cannot be reduced to utility or biological need, 
the cost of labor or a commodity. Meinong persistently analyzes the contra-
dictory relationship between value and utility, value and need, which are con-
flated in the usage of these concepts: people often attach more value to objects 
whose utility is not so obvious and less value to such vitally important things as 
air or water (Meinong 2006: 9). Value must be understood as something more 
universal and it is necessary to systematically analyze psychological and other 
more general theoretical aspects of value. 
Among mental objects, value has constant significance: 
… and my thoughts and even more so my feelings do not always agree with 
what is the most valuable thing for me; yet that has nothing to do with value 
itself. […] For a school pupil it is obviously important to learn to write but in 
his ignorance he does not consider it in the least bit valuable. Similarly, a thing 
about whose properties I am poorly informed or misinformed can seem lack-
ing in value to me but this does not diminish its actual value, even if it remains 
unacknowledged” (Meinong 2006: 24).
Therefore, values exist firmly and independently of a particular person, 
though formed from his/her individual experience, and are universal in rela-
tion to his/her subjectivity. Meinong asserts that “if a thing has value for me, 
it has value for me not only over the limited period when I am thinking of it” 
(Meinong 2006: 67). 
It must be understood that value is an object of the subject’s value attitude 
(Werthaltung), which is a core concept for Meinong’s value theory. This means 
that values for a person vary in their content and their importance (Meinong 
2006: 73–75).
A distinguishing feature of Meinong’s philosophy is his discussion of the 
problem of the so-called value-feeling and the question about the reality of 
objects of value-feelings, desires and forms of their existence. Emotional acts 
reveal a person’s attitude to ethical and aesthetic values, which sometimes are 
not fully rationally and verbally defined, but their givenness in the mind man-
ifests itself through emotions and in language, respectively. In general, we can 
agree that “Meinong, like Brentano before him, considered emotions to be a 
source of objective cognition” (Wolf 1968: 49).
A person experiences multiple feelings of different kinds but at a funda-
mental level these elementary acts of experience can be described as different 
states of sensory pleasure or displeasure. 
Pleasure and displeasure could be determinative attributes of content as equal-
ly as affirmation and negation (Meinong 1988: 90).
Meinong also points out that feelings can be classified according to two 
criteria: feelings based on representations and feelings based on mental expe-
riences. It should be noted that value feelings stem from mental experiences 
that can manifest themselves through judgements or assumptions. 
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Describing the experience of the object’s value, Meinong highlights the sub-
jective nature of this feeling. It is remarkable, however, that the subject becomes 
aware of this feeling in the presence of values that are logically prior and are 
founded on lower-order objects of perception and representation. Emotions 
cannot replace cognition and, although value feelings represent an object, they 
are limited as a way of cognition, just as perception is (Meinong 1988: 95). 
Desire is an active elementary experience and it is intentional, that is, it is 
directed at a certain object that prompts this feeling. This feeling is equiva-
lent to judgement in the intellectual sphere. It should be noted that, when dis-
cussing the object of desire, Meinong did not mean attraction, instincts and 
so forth. In accordance with Herbart’s psychology, which was widely known 
in Austria, Meinong distinguished between such distinct mental acts as desire 
(Begehren), wishes (Wünsche), urges (Triebe), longings (Sehnsucht) and volition 
(Wollen) (Herbart 2003: 189). Therefore, the desires (Begehren, Wollen) that 
Meinong speaks of are given first in emotional experiences, and then in rep-
resentations and concepts, while their unconscious vital core should be ana-
lyzed not by the theory of objects but by psychology alone.
It cannot be said that a person feels desire only in relation to existent ob-
jects or that the theory of objects must deal only with such objects of desire. 
According to Meinong’s general methodological framework, mental objects 
can be existent or non-existent and objects of desire share this characteris-
tic. Meinong points out that a person can imagine, for instance, the desired 
end of the romantic story they are reading about (Meinong 1988: 94). A reader 
knows that the events described in the book are fictional, but when immersed 
in this imaginary reality, they want the main character to survive and the lov-
ing couple to reunite. 
However, in the case when we are dealing with volition (Wollen) rather than 
elementary desire, the object of desire has to be only what is possible. 
True desire, and volition (Wollungen) in particular, are characterized by a pe-
culiar relation to reality, which is similar to the relation between a judgement 
and a fact: what is unachievable cannot be an object of volition (at least in a 
normal way). For instance, I do not desire something that, in my opinion, I al-
ready have, I cannot desire something that actually does not exist: only what is 
possible can be desirable (Meinong 1988: 94). 
An object can exist without being desired, but when it becomes an object 
of desire, in our thought it acquires the quality of ‘being-thus’ (Sosein) and ‘be-
ing-with’ (Mitsein) (Meinong 1988: 93). An object of desire is not as simple as 
it may seem. Meinong thought that desire not only ascribes being or nonbe-
ing to the object of desire but also actualizes the fact of desire experienced by 
the subject, who feels the value of the object of his/her desire. In other words, 
apart from the object of desire, which is the target and the ‘embodiment’ of 
such attitude, objects include value which determines the depth of the feel-
ing of desire, since, according to Meinong, “it is actually impossible to desire 
something to which you are indifferent” (Meinong 1998: 93). The content of 
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the object of desire – desiderative – is revealed in the opposition between 
duty and its dereliction, purposefulness and aimlessness. This means that the 
object of desire is the target which has value and which the subject of desire 
seeks to achieve.
Atemporal Values
Objects of value are perceived by the subject who values them in an emotional 
experience; it is this value-feeling that makes possible an appreciation of any-
thing. Respectively, comprehension (Erfassen) makes this value-feeling con-
scious, which implies determinacy and clarity. Therefore, the apprehension of 
the object of value in our mind oscillates between thought and feeling, between 
rational comprehension and emotional experience. Emotional experience of 
the object prefigures in a way its value-feeling, which enables personal and 
impersonal value attribution. A diverse universe of value-objects of different 
scales is interpreted by Meinong in such a way as to let axiological and psy-
chological aspects of cognition stay open to the verification of the objective 
existence of values and to ensure its empirical verification. 
In his early works (i.e., “Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur 
Werth-Theorie” (1894) and “Über Werthaltung und Wert” [1895]), Meinong 
does not give a detailed account of impersonal values. These evidently exist 
in the mind and determine the basis upon which a subject of cognition justi-
fies and evaluates his reasoning. However, in his attempt to distance himself 
from psychologism, Meinong had to present a more elaborate theory (“Für die 
Psychologie und gegen Psychologismus” [1912]). 
Emotional experience of the object prefigures in a way its value-feeling, 
which enables personal and impersonal value attribution. Objects of value are 
perceived by the subject who values them in an emotional experience; it is this 
value-feeling that makes possible an appreciation of anything. Respectively, 
comprehension (Erfassen) makes this value-feeling conscious, which implies 
determinacy and clarity. Therefore, the apprehension of the object of value in 
our mind oscillates between thought and feeling, between rational compre-
hension and emotional experience. 
Meinong highlights the fact that value attribution relies on value-feeling, in 
our speech acts we are already detached from emotional experience and per-
ceive values as impersonal and even absolute. “Value judgement consummates 
the process of comprehension (Erfassen) of value just as the judgement about 
senses consummates the process of sensual perception” (Wolf 1968: 49). Thus, 
the methodological problem is solved: absolute values are given foundation be-
yond the limitations of classical transcendentalism. It is the language where 
values truly exist; it is the foundation that accounts for their reality.
In 1917 Meinong goes back to writing his theory of value-objects (Über emo-
tionale Präsentation, [1917]). His posthumously-published work “Zur Grund-
legung der allgemeinen Werttheorie” (1923) expounded his theory of values 
in a comprehensive and systematic manner and combined his early and more 
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elaborate views on ethics. In his typology of objects Meinong now discerns 
‘basic’ classes: objects of emotional acts and objects of desire. The objects that 
are experienced by an individual can be intellectually or emotionally repre-
sented. Intellectual representations produce objects and objectives, while emo-
tional representations produce objects of appreciation (Dignitativ) and objects 
of desire (Desiderativ). 
They are more akin to objectives than objects, since they belong to a higher or-
der of objects … Among dignitatives one should point to the old trinity – truth 
(in as much as no mere comprehension is at stake), beauty, the good, and prob-
ably pleasure should be added. Among desideratives duty and purpose should 
be named (Meinong 1988: 76). 
For example, an individual posits truth as a value, which is represented in 
its effect through judgement. Truth in this case is not an eternal value, which 
exists in the realm of absolute universals, but it is a determinate object pres-
ent in mental act of an emotional relation to the process of understanding. In 
other words, a subject of cognitive relation seeks the truth, not as a mere out-
come of cognition, but also as a value. One could infer that, for Meinong, de-
sideratives, or the objects of desire are manifested as purposes, which deter-
mine the actions, volitions, while the object of desire is present in the mental 
act as the valuable, necessary or objectively mandatory. 
The relation between the objects of mind and time, or more precisely, the 
presence of these objects in time Meinong analyzes with respect to distinction 
between objects and objectives. Since objectives are present constantly and are 
considered only in relation to the present time, at a specific moment, they are 
timeless (zeitlos) (Meinong 1910). Dignitatives and desideratives, as objects of 
a higher order, are more akin to objectives ad therefore are timeless. Thus, the 
foundation for impersonal, absolute values is established. 
Ethical Values: Metaphysical Challenge 
In the Foreword to the posthumous edition of his book on the foundations of 
the theory of objects, his widow observes that at the center of Meinong’s re-
flection lies not only the theory of objects but also ethical questions (Meinong 
1923). In the 1920s, his focus settled on the prospects of science because the 
separation of academic ethics from political interests, which used to be evi-
dent prior to the war, had become undermined. Meinong explains that this 
separation was merely a ‘public preaching’, or as he writes in his autobiograph-
ical “Self-presentation” (Selbstdarstellung 1988), it was a ‘moralizing veneer’ 
(Meinong 1988: 119). It will be possibly replaced by spiritual hunger. The the-
matization of ethics in its metaphysical aspects forces Meinong to look back 
on his justification of values from his theory of objects. Atemporal values must 
be conceptualized determinately in a situation when ‘time changes’ (Wandels 
der Zeiten) and ethics is in crisis (ibid). 
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Aesthetic and ethical value differ according to their respective relation to 
reality. While looking at a rose, the individual sees red, but also appreciates 
its beauty and sometimes covets it. This simple example demonstrates the 
complexity and multidimensionality of the universe of mental objects. It is 
clear judgements on the beautiful and the necessary are grounded in specific 
objects. In a great number of judgements, the impersonal existence of objects 
which engender values can be observed. For instance, in a discussion about 
the originality of a painting the judgment “That is not art!” refers to an objec-
tively present and absolutely conceived notion of art. If asked what art is, our 
critic will usually invoke an example of ‘true art’, a masterpiece, which is uni-
versally acknowledged. A. Meinong alerts us to the fact that aesthetic values 
lose their normativity in subjectivist and relativist discourses; yet the works 
of art given us in our experience, or in Meinong’s words “the presentation of 
the aesthetically valuable in space” (Meinong 1988: 99) invigorates the value 
in subject’s mind.
Unlike aesthetic values, ethical ones cannot be embodied in reality, be rep-
resented in the form of a work of art. There exists a tradition within philoso-
phy to ground ethical values in sentiments which the subject of a value rela-
tion experiences, such as pleasure or pain, joy or sadness. As was mentioned 
above, moral sentiments represent the object of a value relation, but cannot 
reveal the content of an object, that is reveal the content of value. This tra-
dition is also hardly capable of justifying the universality of ethical values. A 
utilitarian interpretation of ethical values leads to similar kind of relativism, 
in Meinong’s view. However, judgements in which the human behavior is eval-
uated in categories of right and wrong, bad and good, confirm the existence 
of impersonal values. 
Ethical relation presupposes that a subject in their action takes into ac-
count the presence of value, which confers obligation. Thus, personal value 
coincides with impersonal value, whereas the object of desire, if it is ethically 
valuable, is presented as obligatory and impersonal. When impersonal value 
is understood as obligatory, it is conceived of as a norm. Ethical imperative, 
which is so often invoked, cannot refer to anything other than this obligation 
(Meinong 1988: 98). Because the object is present in the mind and not created 
in the process of cognition, ethical value, in the same vein, is not created by 
the subject, neither in cognition, nor in the ethical relation. 
Conclusion
In comparison with his mentor Franz Brentano, Alexius Meinong approach-
es the problem of values from a more psychological perspective, which allows 
him to discuss the existence of values in different aspects. Analysis of values 
from the theory of objects can be also discovered in axiology of Christian von 
Ehrenfels, who, in his “System der Werttheorie” (1897), insists on bridging 
the problem of values with the psychological study of desire. However, in his 
approach the emphasis is placed on desire and it is desire that dominates the 
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value consciousness. Thus, “definition of value for Ehrenfels does not stem 
from the object” (Reinhard 2005: 966). Nevertheless, Alexius Meinong’s and 
Christian von Ehrenfels’s axiological views give Karl Wolf sufficient reason to 
say that they seek 
“to reconstitute the unity of reality and values. It was this project that defines orig-
inality of the Graz philosophical school and its theory of value” (Wolf 1968: 47). 
Researchers usually distinguish two phases in the development of Meinong’s 
theory (Dölling 1999: 13), which are quite different in their conceptualization 
of values. It is clear that Meinong’s resolution to overcome the limitations of 
psychologism and to justify the existence of impersonal, atemporal values was 
motivated by the existential challenges of his time. 
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Ekaterina Čerepanova
Opravdavanje atemporalnih vrednosti u teoriji objekata  
Aleksijusa Majnonga
Apstrakt
U istoriji filozofije se Majnongovo interesovanje za aksiologiju tradicionalno videlo kao ve-
zano za njegova ranija dela. Međutim, ako analiziramo njegove radove posle 1917. u kojima 
Meinong razmatra vanvremenske vrednosti, postaje jasno da se prestao interesovati za psi-
hologiju. Štaviše, pošto teorija objekta, po Majnongovom viđenju, ne može biti deo metafi-
zike, morao se pozabaviti dodatnom metodološkom teškoćom dokazivanja da dobro postoji 
nezavisno od ljudske subjektivnosti. Članak razmatra Majnongovo razumevanje objekta  želje, 
objekta osećanja vrednosti i vezu između etičkih vrednosti kao objekata svesti i vremena. 
Pokazano je da se, prema Majnongu, vrednosti u stvari nalaze u jeziku i mogu se objasniti 
samo kroz jezik.  
Ključne reči: Majnongova teorija vrednosti, subjekt želje, subjekt aksioloških osećanja, po-
stojanje apsolutnih vrednosti, psihologizam
